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‘The economic inconsistency of EU human rights policy'  
 
The identity of the European Union (EU) has changed over the past decades. From a purely 
economic identity, the EU developed into an institution with an international political 
character as well. However, many previous studies have indicated that reconciling these two 
identities has never been easy. One of the areas in which this struggle between identities 
becomes clear is the area of human rights promotion, where the EU has faced several 
problems reconciling its interests in trade relations with their ambitions to promote human 
rights. The relations of the EU with emerging economies in Asia are examples of where the 
interests of trade and human rights come into conflict (Börzel and Risse 2004, 18). As King 
states, the EU can use sanctions in order to address human rights, but often the actual 
implementation of these economic measures remain limited due to the reluctance of several 
member states to risk disrupting the economic relations with those countries (King 1999, 
336). Consequently, Smith argues that the EU is willing to address human rights violations 
with hard measures in smaller countries such as Burma while the economic important 
countries enjoy a more softer approach (Smith 2004, 195). In addition, Smith states that the 
EU has been reluctant to address issues such as Guantanamo Bay, the death penalty and the 
rejection of the ICC by the United States because their relationship is far too important to let 
these issues disrupt it. As a result, the EU’s external human rights policy is known for its 
inconsistency (Smith 2004, 139).  
In this thesis, I want to assess whether these inconsistencies can be explained by 
different economic interests of the EU in their different trading partners. Several authors have 
done research on this topic before through several case studies and have clearly indicated such 
an inconsistency (Crawford 2000; Smith 1998 and DelBiondo 2011 on ACP cases). However, 
the quantitative analysis of a wider range of cases has remained limited in the amount of cases 
and the scope of instruments considered (Warkotsch 2010; Saltnes 2013). With my research I 
want to contribute to the field of human rights studies by doing a quantitative analysis of the 
inconsistency in human rights policy and see whether the argument on economic interests 
holds for the whole population of EU trading partners. Furthermore, my research could imply 
some policy recommendations for the EU to reconsider their human rights policy and create 
more awareness for the selection bias that has been encountered in approaching the 
inconsistency of its human rights policy. 
To this end I draw on the conclusions from different case studies that have been done 
by several authors. In determining its instruments for addressing human rights, the EU is 
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expected to balance the economic costs of those instruments with the benefits of achieving 
human rights improvement. Despite this general consensus in the existing literature that the 
EU intervention of human rights is determined by a cost-benefit analysis of the EU, I argue 
that this approach overlooks some other goals that the EU may strive for: long term stability 
rather than short term gain. 
Therefore, my research question is: To what extent do economic interests influence the 
human rights policy of the EU towards different economic partners? In this thesis, I argue that 
while many case studies state that the EU values economic interests over human rights issues 
in countries with which it has an intensive economic relationship, this argument cannot be 
generalized for the whole spectrum of countries the EU trades with. Consequently, it is argued 
that the economic costs of hard measures such as sanctions cannot be generalized for all the 
countries the EU trades with.  
 In order to support my argument I have conducted a quantitative study of 519 cases in 
order to investigate the potential inconsistency in the different instruments the EU uses to 
address human rights in third countries. The data for the analysis have been gathered from the 
Annual Reports on Human Rights of the past four years and different databases such as 
Eurostat, CIRI and Worldbank. The analysis is divided in three distinct analyses to approach 
my research question from three different angles. In order to elaborate on my argument, I will 
discuss the arguments made by several case studies and subsequently pose an alternative view 
to their arguments. These case studies have approached the EU mainly from a self-interested 
cost-benefit perspective while I alternatively aim to see the EU in the light of a more 
environment-oriented approach. To test my argument, I have constructed a binary variable 
that tests in which cases the EU interferes at all, a count variable which measures how many 
measures the EU applies in the different cases and finally an ordinal variable of human rights 
policy which is based on the expected costs a human rights measure will impose on both 
countries. 
 In this analysis I find significant evidence for an effect of the amount of trade on the 
human rights policy of the EU. However, these findings are not consistent across the various 
models of analysis: the analyses show that this is a positive effect, rather than a negative 
effect as would be expected concerning the existing literature. In other words, the EU is more 
concerned to interfere in countries when the intensiveness of the trade relation increases. The 
direction of the EU interference, softer or harder, when trade intensiveness goes up does not 
seem to be significantly determined by the amount of trade but rather by the intensiveness of a 
trade relationship indicated by the existence of a Preferential Trade Agreement. On the whole, 
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my research tends to find more evidence for the environmental approach of the EU interfering 
in countries in order to keep the milieu in which they maintain their trading relationships 
stable.  
 Thus, my analysis will proceed as follows. First an overview of the existing literature 
on economic inconsistency in human rights policy will be given. Next, I present my 
environment-oriented approach of EU behaviour. I discuss how I collected the data on my 
main independent variables and control variables and how they are expected to have an effect 
on the dependent variable: human rights policy. Subsequently, I present the results from my 
regression analysis and discuss whether they provide more support for my theory or the 
theory obtained from case study research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Economic inconsistency theoretically determined 
 
The economic inconsistency in the human rights policy of the EU has been a commonly 
studied subject. However, these studies were mainly conducted on the basis of several cases 
in which this conflict of interests has already been present. In the following section, an 
overview of the conclusions of these case studies will be provided. Consequently, I will 
provide an alternative argument that has been left out in the theories of these case studies.  
There are several inconsistencies indicated in the human rights policy of the EU. Saltnes 
(2013) argues that the EU has been accused of double standards and sidestepping human 
rights norms if respecting them involves costs. Therefore, policies promoting human rights 
are considered to be simply rhetorical and concealing true national interests (Saltnes 2013, 1). 
In addition, Smith notes that the EU is often reluctant to use coercion and therefore stays on 
the safe side by just having a political dialogue. Therefore, the effectiveness of the measures 
to address human rights violations remain dependent on the willingness of the partners of the 
EU to even discuss human rights at all and thus its policy can do little in the countries where it 
is needed the most (Smith 2008, 133). This statement is supported by Börzel and Risse (2004) 
who say that this cooperative approach, besides being reluctant to impose sanctions, also lacks 
clear criteria to evaluate a third countries’ compliance with, as Takacs (2010) indicated, vague 
provisions on human rights (Börzel and Risse 2004, 7). However, these findings are not 
restricted to the case of the EU alone but characterises the international human rights regime 
as a whole. Due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms of human rights treaties, they are 
dependent on the willingness of states to incorporate these norms into their domestic policies 
and therefore are of little effect in the countries that violate most human rights (Simmons 
2009, 195; Smith 2008, 165).  
As discussed above, the inconsistency of human rights policy reduces its effectiveness. 
Jack Donnelly (2013) challenges this argument by putting the inconsistency statements a bit 
more into a foreign policy perspective. He states that when causes of human rights violations 
are different, it might be appropriate to also apply different policy instruments to address 
them. However, he also argues that the variation in instruments has to be consistent and in the 
light of an overall trade-off of goals and values for foreign policy. When the ordering of 
priorities can justify this trade-off, the inconsistency exists for the benefit of the foreign 
policy. When it cannot be justified, inconsistency exists because of hypocrisy (Donnelly 2013, 
205). Subsequently, there are several cases in which this justification of inconsistency can be 
questioned. In the case of Sudan in 2007, the EU did utter several expressions of concern on 
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the situation in Darfur but the actions taken to improve the situation remained limited to an 
arms embargo and diplomatic sanctions. At the same time, the EU did impose economic 
sanctions to countries such as Belarus, Uzbekistan and Liberia in which the human rights 
situation was far less alarming than in Sudan (Rettman 2007). Smith argues that the reason for 
the reluctance of the EU to impose economic sanctions on Sudan was that there was too much 
at stake. The EU did not want to risk disruption of several peace deals that had been made, oil 
supplies or Sudan’s cooperation in combating terrorism (Smith 2008, 139). Another case that 
illustrates inconsistency due to broader strategic interests such as energy supplies and the 
cooperation against terrorism is the criticism of the EU on Israel. In 2007, the EU shifted its 
focus from criticizing human rights violations in Israel to strengthening its relations with the 
country on the basis of shared values despite the fact that violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law still continued (Tocci 2007, 116). In addition, the EU 
negotiations on a stabilization and association agreement with Serbia, that were suspended on 
the basis of conditionality in 2006 because of Serbia’s failure to live up to its obligations to 
the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), were suddenly resumed 
when Serbia was needed for a decision on the final status of Kosovo (Tocci 2007, 69; Smith 
2008, 139). 
Regarding all these examples the question arises: Why should third countries respond 
to the human rights actions of the EU when other countries do not face the same measures? 
This question is a very important one asked by Smith and many other authors such as Tocci 
(2007), Rettman (2007), Donnelly (2013), Börzel and Risse (2004) and King (1999) who are 
all cited above. However, they do not get much further than indicating that there is an 
inconsistency present. The follow up question would be what the driving forces behind this 
inconsistency are. It is often argued that economic interests might explain a great deal of the 
inconsistency. Some authors, such as Hafner-Burton (2005), Mastaduno (2008), Balducci 
(2008), Fierro (2003) and Smith (2004 and 2008), make an effort to discuss this possible 
explanation but do not elaborate on it extensively or assess its explaining value with numbers. 
In the next section, I will discuss their economic explanations for this inconsistency in the EU 
human rights policy. 
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Why should we expect the EU’s economic interests to have any impact on its human 
rights policies?  
 
Addressing human rights in bilateral relations is often linked to the concept of conditionality. 
For the EU, this link is enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht. The establishment of this link 
between economic conditionality and human rights indicates that there is a belief at the EU 
level that conditionality is an effective measure to address human rights (Balducci 2008, 23). 
However, several authors (Börzel and Risse 2004; Smith 2008; Takacs 2010) claim that due 
to the inconsistency in applying these conditionality measures, the EU human rights policy 
fails to achieve its goal. Why then, is the link with conditionality made in the first place? And 
why is there so much inconsistency in applying these policies? 
  An incentive-based explanation that answers both questions states that the logic of 
economic conditionality sounds feasible but due to several challenges to the implementation 
of conditionality, it is very hard to maintain in practice. The logic implies that human rights 
violations are calculated acts and therefore imposing an economic cost or benefit to a country 
will eventually lead to a change in political behaviour. The cost-benefit analysis of repressive 
states will then be altered by the economic benefit or sanction. The benefit of economic, 
instead of for example political, measures is that it not only affects the target government but 
also its population. Therefore it ensures that when the government does not respond to the 
economic measures, the population will put pressure on the government to do something 
(Mastanduno 2008, Hafner-Burton 2005). 
 In addition, compared to human rights agreements that have no link with economic 
conditionality, the agreements containing an economic component were proven to be more 
effective (Hafner-Burton 2005). Human rights agreements without economic conditionality, 
so called ‘soft’ agreements, lack the power of compliance because there is no material interest 
for human rights repressing countries to conform. Therefore, it is argued that hard measures 
of economic conditionality are necessary in order to make states comply to human rights 
norms because it makes states legally bound to their obligations (Hafner-Burton 2005, 595). 
The EU maintains such hard human rights agreements by including a human rights clause in 
their Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA’s) with certain third countries. 
However, due to several challenges, it is difficult for governments to stick to this 
policy of economic sanctions. First of all, it is difficult to maximize the economic costs to 
such an extent that it really affects the target government. Those governments can often easily 
turn to alternative economic partners or are such great economic powers themselves that they 
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can survive without the cooperation with the sanctioning government (Mastanduno 2008, 
210). Secondly, sanctions can result in an opposite effect than what was intended. The 
negative conditionality can be used by the target government to create national solidarity 
among its populations when the sanction is perceived as an external threat. Thirdly, imposing 
sanctions may lead to political problems for the senders when the sanction is regarded to 
disproportionately affect an innocent population (Mastaduno, 2008, 211).  
Most importantly, imposing sanctions can also be costly for the since they have to 
maintain political support for the sanction. This might be difficult since the sending party 
itself also misses an important economic cooperation agreement when this agreement is 
disrupted by the imposing of sanctions. This argument implies that imposing sanctions to 
address human rights might also be based on a cost-benefit analysis of the senders, not only of 
the target governments. This may be one of the most important causes of the inconsistency in 
the human rights policy of the EU. Evidence for this inconsistency has been provided in 
several sources (Fierro 2003, Rosas 2011, Balducci 2008). Smith (2004) shows that despite 
the fact that the EU is able to alter or suspend agreements with repressive third countries 
through the human rights clause, no such agreement has been suspended as a result of this 
clause (Miller 2004; Smith 2004, 190). More importantly, the most important trading partners 
of the EU are shown not even to be subject to the clause. The clause is not included in so 
called ‘sectoral agreements’ which means that the agreement does not have such a wide 
ranging, formal character as the normal agreements have. In addition, the agreements 
concluded with countries before 1995, including Canada, China and ASEAN, still do not 
include a human rights clause. Furthermore, the EU signed a less formal agreement with 
Australia and New Zealand because both countries refused the inclusion of a human rights 
clause. Towards all these countries the EU has been rather soft, meaning not imposing 
sanctions, when it comes to addressing human rights issues (Smith 2004, 197). The human 
rights clause has therefore been criticised for not matching reality.  
In addition, states of little importance to the EU or one of the member states, often 
located in Africa, are said to be subjected to negative conditionality more often than other 
states. More important African states are shown to be exempted from the most severe 
economic sanctions, such as Nigeria which did suffer political and economic sanctions but 
these sanctions did not entail oil. This shows a clear example of the EU valuing their 
economic interests over their interests in protecting human rights. Moreover, human rights 
violations in Algeria have only been addressed through demarches and declarations, a coup 
d’état in Pakistan in 1999 was not followed by a suspension of aid and the agreement with 
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Russia, who is bound by the human rights clause in its PCA, has never been considered to be 
suspended (Smith 2004, 195).  
Furthermore, Smith argues that third countries with similar human rights records have 
been treated differently by EU policy for several reasons. Firstly, the use of negative measures 
on a certain third country is blocked by one or more member states because of national 
commercial interests. Secondly, member states can block negative measures because of the 
political or strategic importance of a certain third country and thirdly, doubts may arise about 
the effectiveness of negative measures to affect policy-making in the third country. These 
inconsistencies impose severe limits on its efficiency. Yet consensus is needed to implement 
negative measures and given the various international interests of the member states, this is 
hard to achieve. Even in cases where there is an agreement reached among member states, the 
decision to impose negative measures will be based on the country where the lowest amount 
of common interests is at stake which results in a softening of the initial measures. In those 
cases where negative measures are opposed by one or more member states, often a human 
rights dialogue is held in order to mask the fact of non-action (Smith 2008, 137 - 138).  These 
findings indicate a problem in the collective action mechanism of the EU. On the one hand it 
enables the member states to hide behind it when it comes to responsibility but on the other 
hand it disables the EU as a whole to undertake action when there is only one member state 
strongly opposing negative measures. 
Another realist explanation for the inconsistency in human rights instruments used 
against different countries is provided by Kinzelbach (2013). He argues that powerful 
economic states are expected to be less vulnerable to external economic pressures to comply 
with human rights norms than materially weaker targets. A country’s material vulnerability 
depends on the damage it endures when a trade relation with a third country is disrupted. 
When a country itself has enough resources or has enough other trade relations in tact to 
substitute for the economic loss, it is considered less vulnerable to these economic measures 
than countries that do not have these resources (Kinzelbach 2013, 168). This does not mean 
that materially powerful states are completely immune to these pressures but negative and 
coercive incentives are less likely to have effect against those states than when used against 
more vulnerable states. From a cost-benefit perspective, altering the cost-benefit analysis of a 
country with low material vulnerability in order to ensure more protection of human rights is 
considered to impose an even higher cost on the sender when it wants to achieve this 
protection by using harsh economic measures. Furthermore, the sender is not very likely to 
obtain any benefits from using these measures since the target country is not materially 
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vulnerable to any of these measures. However, it can be questioned if this justifies not to use 
negative economic measures at all.  
There are several other explanations found in the literature for the inconsistency of the 
EU human rights policy. For example, the inconsistency in the EU human rights policy can 
also be explained by the fact that the countries towards which the EU uses harsher measures, 
violate human rights to a greater extent (Saltnes 2013, 2). In addition, another explanation 
might be political considerations. For example, considerations on nuclear weapons may 
explain why the EU has limited its criticisms on human rights violations of Russia in the past. 
The cooperation of Russia is needed in UN Security Council for resolutions on several issues 
such as nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives (Smith 2008, 167). Furthermore, 
the EU has not pushed further human rights reforms by regimes in the South-Mediterranean 
area since its consequences could cause endangered energy supplies, mass migration to the 
EU or the provocation of terrorist attacks (Balfour 2006, 126). This statement is further 
supported by DelBiondo (2011) who notes that the lack of EU sanctions on Ethiopia, Nigeria 
and Kenya can be explained by those countries being the main allies of the EU in stabilization 
operations in the region, for example in Somalia (DelBiondo 2011, 386). Moreover, another 
argument that aligns with these political considerations is the fact that sanctions are more 
likely to be imposed on neighbouring countries than countries that are further away in order to 
keep the direct environment stable. This is supported by the statement of Börzel and Risse 
(2004) saying that the toughest conditionality is applied towards accession candidates such as 
Turkey and the Balkan states (Börzel and Risse 2004, 27).  
As Smith already argued, the inconsistency in the EU can also be explained by 
disagreement about the effectiveness of a certain measure to address human rights in a 
specific third state. However it is hard to measure effectiveness especially when it considers 
the perceived effectiveness by different member states. Yet an argument provided by 
Warkotsch (2010) may account for some of this perceived effectiveness by addressing the 
‘democracy-stability’ dilemma. His argument states that the EU is more reluctant to use 
measures with more severe consequences to address human rights in countries that are 
relatively weak because harsh measures will likely have an even more destabilizing effect on 
the domestic situation and thus on the human rights violations (Warkotsch 2010, 84). 
Furthermore, Moravcsik (2000) argues somewhat likewise that addressing human rights will 
be the most effective in countries in transition to democracy since they have some awareness 
of human rights and are fairly willing to cooperate but still need more incentives to protect 
them to the fullest (Moravcsik 2000, 244). 
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Why should we expect the EU to interfere when interests increase?  
 
The theoretical arguments provided above have, despite their differences, some 
aspects in common. The most common denominator is the cost-benefit approach to EU 
decision-making on human rights. When a measure imposes costs on the EU by the risk of 
disrupting a valuable trade relationship, the EU is assumed to be more likely to choose a less 
costly measure in order to maintain the good relationship with that specific country. Harsher 
measures thus increase the costs of using those measures to third countries by the risk they 
entail to disrupt good relationships with third countries. Hence it is theorized by those case 
studies, that the instruments the EU will use in its human rights policy towards different 
economic partners are based on a cost-benefit calculation. In this calculation the EU considers 
the economic costs of imposing severe measures on a specific state in order to address human 
rights versus the benefits the EU gains by the moral value of addressing human rights and the 
contribution it will make to actual state compliance. This cost-benefit analysis is said to be 
essential for determining the risk of taking action or not. When the EU does act, it might hurt 
economic interests without even achieving improvement of human rights which makes the 
decision to act in hindsight quite costly. In addition, the damage done to the EU’s economic 
interests is higher when the EU addresses human rights in more important economic partners 
than partners of lower interest. Therefore, these case studies conclude that the EU carefully 
considers its economic interests before even taking action at all, and when the EU does act, it 
carefully considers the instruments at its disposal by the benefits they gain from imposing 
them versus the costs the EU risks to endure when a measure disrupts the economic relation 
with the specific trading partner.  
However, this theory is based on the conclusions of several case studies. Can the 
inconsistency due to economic interests be generalized for the whole population of countries 
in the world? And why should we expect the EU to act on a cost-benefit basis? Despite the 
fact that a general consensus exists in previous literature that EU human rights intervention is 
a result of a cost-benefit analysis of the EU, I think that several factors are overlooked when 
using this approach. First, in most of the case studies, this cost-benefit rationale is merely 
assumed but not justified clearly. The functions the EU performs does not prevent it from 
being altruistic instead of self-interested in several occasions, especially when its people want 
it to do so. Secondly, the focus on short-term costs and benefits causes previous research to 
overlook the fact that the EU might be focused more on long term stability instead. Therefore, 
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I would like to propose an alternative approach in this thesis to see whether this approach is 
supported by the findings of my quantitative analysis.  
In contrast to the assumption that the EU acts on a self-interested basis by making 
cost-benefit analysis, the behaviour of the EU can also be driven by other goals. As Arnold 
Wolfers has theorized, states can also be focused on achieving milieu goals instead of 
possession goals. Those milieu goals are directed at improving the environment in which a 
state exists (Wolfers 1962, 73). Some aspects cannot be achieved by one state on its own. 
Wolfers uses the examples of peace and international law. Those two concepts cannot be 
possessed by one state alone. It requires the cooperation of many states in order to achieve 
them. Occasionally,  states realize that they cannot win a fight for a certain issue on their own 
since efforts of many nations are needed to succeed. Yet these efforts do not occur unless they 
are in the common interest of these states (Wolfers 1962, 76).  
Furthermore, Wolfers argues that milieu goals can also be considered means to 
achieve possession goals. By investing in the creation of a peaceful and stable environment, a 
state can be more secure of obtaining benefits from this environment (Wolfers 1962, 74). 
Several examples of such instances, where a generous gesture was also found to serve 
national interests, in foreign policy exists. For example the Marshall Plan served the national 
security or economic interests of the United States as well as it helped to rebuild post-war 
Europe. As Wolfers states: “The difference need not be one only of greater or lesser security 
or acquired possessions; it may also signify a difference in happiness, in future opportunities , 
and perhaps in moral satisfaction” (Wolfers 1962, 75). Applied to the human rights policy of 
the EU, I argue that instead of being reluctant to interfere in a valuable trade relation out of 
fear of disrupting it, the EU is more motivated to interfere in such valuable relations because 
it wants to create a stable environment in order to maintain this relationship.  
This theory is supported by several arguments stating that compliance with human 
rights norms is not achieved through negative measures but rather through positive 
stimulation. There has been some discussion about the effectiveness of sanctions. It is 
suggested that sometimes it is more effective to stimulate economic and political links in 
order to influence internal political change. The argument states that economic sanctions will 
only lead to a temporary, strategically, adjustment of behaviour by states but the actual 
change in believe towards human rights will not be altered (Dai 2013, 94; Smith 2004). 
Several alternatives to sanctions are introduced in order to enhance protection of human rights 
such as empowering domestic actors or enhancing economic activity and create a durable 
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stability in the environment. These alternatives focus more on capacity-building in a state 
rather than punishment.  
In addition, it is argued that sanctions are not that effective in states with limited 
capacity to keep their executives in control. This limited capacity its caused by a lack of 
efficient administration structures and institutions that enable them to effectively enforce 
centrally made decisions (Risse and Ropp 2013, 17). When it is not the state but some quasi-
governmental or non-state actors that are violating human rights, punishing the state by 
sanctions does not render much success. However, it is also argued that persuasive measures 
such as dialogue and statements will render less effective for the same reason. Therefore, 
human rights advocates should focus on strengthening the capacity of the state in order to 
ensure better human rights protection. In the EU there has been some agreement that negative 
conditionality would be ineffective and integration, dialogue and trade should be the 
instruments to address and promote human rights (Smith 2008, 137). Furthermore, the target 
of sanctions is often not very clear so the risk of innocent harm is rather high compared to 
softer measures.  
In the following sections, this theory will be tested on the basis of a quantitative 
analysis. Regarding the critical analysis of my theory, I have constructed the following 
hypotheses to be tested: H1: ‘The EU is likely to interfere with more measures in countries 
with which it has a more intensive trade relationship than in countries with which it has a less 
intense relationship’. When there is a great deal of trade interaction between the EU and a 
certain third country, this country may be regarded as a valuable trading partner and the EU is 
expected to be more concerned by creating a stable (economic) environment in order to 
support their valuable trade relationship. H2: ‘The EU is more likely to interfere with harsher 
measures in countries with which it has a more intensive trade relationship than in countries 
with which it has a less intense relationship’. When the EU is more concerned with creating a 
stable environment, it is expected that it will also use stricter measures in order to create and 
maintain that stability.  
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Measuring inconsistency 
 Independent Variable: Economic Interests 
As my theory stated, economic interests may explain the amount and type of human rights 
measures taken against human rights violations in different trading partners of the EU. In the 
next section, I will elaborate on the indicators of economic interests and human rights policy 
as well as several control variables I have introduced in order to control for other explanations 
of EU interference in certain countries. First, import indicates the economic interests of the 
EU in a specific third country because when the amounts are high, it makes the EU dependant 
on the relation with that specific EU country and less dependant on a third country from 
which the EU imports a lesser amount. In other words, the higher the amount of goods 
imported from a specific third country, the more concerned the EU will be to keep the 
relationship stable. The same goes for export the other way around. The EU needs countries to 
sell their products to in order to gain income. Therefore, the EU has more interests in 
countries to which it exports a high amount of goods than in countries to which the export 
amounts are lower.  
 Furthermore, the EU has several agreements with different countries that seal their 
cooperation for a longer period. These Preferential Trade Agreements grant preferential 
market access to the countries with which a PTA is in place. The EU has PTA’s with a lot of 
countries all over the world but not all of them. Accordingly, PTA’s may form an indicator of 
the economic interests the EU has in the countries with which it does have a PTA since these 
agreements reduce the limits of reciprocal market access. Therefore the states that are in a 
PTA with the EU can be considered more important trading partners than the states that are 
not in a PTA. Moreover, the PTA’s form a channel through which the EU can address human 
rights through the human rights clause or conditionality clauses (Hafner-Burton 2005, 595).   
 
Measuring economic Interests 
To measure my Independent Variables, I have scored all the 200 EU trading partners on their 
import and export and PTA’s made. The importance of trading partners was determined on 
the basis of the amount of imported goods by the EU in millions and the same will be done for 
export. These numbers were deducted from the data provided by Eurostat. Furthermore, I 
have constructed a binary variable which indicates if the EU has a PTA with a specific third 
country or not. The countries with which the EU has such a PTA are coded as (1) and the 
countries with which the EU has not, are coded as (0). Data for this variable were collected 
from the website of the European Commission (2014). 
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Other explanatory variables 
In the theoretical section above, several other explanations for the inconsistency in the EU 
human rights policy have been discussed. To control for these other explanations, some 
control variables were included in my research. Firstly, the type of trade that is mainly 
conducted between the EU and a third country also indicates the importance of a trading 
partner. As DelBiondo states, the distinction in importance between Nigeria on the one hand 
and Kenya and Ethiopia on the other cannot be made on the basis of the size of their 
economies, because all three belong to the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, but on the basis of 
the type of trade. Nigeria mainly exports oil to the EU which is far more valuable for the EU 
than agriculture which is mainly exported by Kenya and Ethiopia (DelBiondo 2011, 388). 
Thus, the type of trade measured in the amount of goods in million euro’s forms controls for  
the fact that human rights measures taken may be determined by this indicator of the 
economic importance of the trading partners of the EU.  
In addition, the importance of economic trade partners should be controlled for the 
General System of Preferences (GSP) the EU conducts. In this unilateral system, the EU 
determines which countries can pay less or no duties when they export goods to the EU. This 
system was designed in 2004, in order to help developing countries to provide in their specific 
needs (European Commission 2013, 1). On the basis of these preferences, the trade balance 
with certain countries might increase but this does not necessarily say something about the 
importance of a specific country.  
 Second, the extent to which human rights are violated in the different trading partners 
of the EU was assessed in order to control for the fact that the EU uses harsher measures on 
lesser important countries because these countries simply violate more human rights. Thirdly, 
the EU neighbourhood policy has been taken into account in order to control for the 
possibility that the EU imposes stricter measures on countries that are close by. Fourthly, the 
democratic stability of a country was addressed in order to control for the perceived 
effectiveness of stricter, more destabilizing, measures on countries with an unstable 
democratic regime. There are two situations in which sanctions are expected to have a more 
destabilizing effects on a country. First, the amount of civil unrest has to be established. When 
there is civil turmoil in a country, the situation can be worsened or prolonged by harsh 
measures as a response to human rights violations. Second, when a country endures severe 
poverty, the imposition of economic sanctions or the reduction of aid can also cause a 
worsened or prolonged situation (Warkotsch 2010, 84).   
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Finally, the type of human rights that have been violated influences the harshness of 
the way of addressing them. For example, DelBiondo argues that negative measures are seen 
as a tool of ultimate remedy for which agreement is hard to achieve in the Council of 
Ministers. As a result, negative measures are only imposed when there is little room for 
interpretation on the seriousness of the violation, for example when a coup d’état takes place 
(DelBiondo 2011, 381; Saltnes 2013, 7). However, Saltnes 2013 shows that there is mixed 
evidence on the different categories of human rights violations because they are more 
problematic to judge in terms of when reaction is really necessary (Saltnes 2013, 8). Yet, this 
variable has been included in order to control for a specific type of violation to which the EU 
reacts with more severe measures, regardless of the country that conduct the violations. 
 
Other explaining variables 
The variables of alternative explanations that I will consider in my quantitative analysis also 
have to be operationalized. In order to control for the type of trade, these variables were 
measured on the basis of trade balance retrieved from Eurostat. The Eurostat database 
distinguishes six sections of goods based on the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC). These different sections might control for a difference in economic importance since 
one product category might be of more importance to the EU than another. Therefore the six 
different categories are distinguished in the database by the trade balance for those specific 
countries in million euro’s. The first category includes agricultural goods such as food, drinks 
and tobacco, SITC sections 0 and 1. The second category contains crude materials, inedible 
except oils, SITC sections 2 and 4. Energy products are included in SITC section 3 and 
Chemicals and related products are contained in SITC section 5.  SITC section 6 and 8 consist 
of manufactured goods and SITC section 7 contains machinery (CBS 2014). 
In addition, the GSP of the EU distinguishes three categories: the standard 
arrangement (GSP) includes partial or complete removal of tariffs on two thirds of the 
exported goods. This category was coded with (1). The more advanced arrangement (GSP+) 
includes deep tariffs cuts for countries that have ratified and implemented international 
conventions relating to human rights. This category was coded with (2). The third category, 
Everything But Arms (EBA), grants duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market for all 
products. This category was coded with (3). There are also countries that are excluded from 
the GSP such as Belarus or are not targeted by the system, for example because they are not 
developing and in need of unilateral preferential market access. Those countries were coded 
with (0).   
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The extent to which states violate human rights can be indicated by data of the CIRI 
database. This index provides numbers on how often a country violates certain categories of 
human rights. This variable will then be operationalized by an additive index of the different 
right that ranges from 0 to 30. The countries with the lowest number have the most human 
rights violations and the countries with the higher numbers violate the least. In addition, the 
type of violations can also be operationalized according to the categories of the CIRI human 
rights violations index. The database uses four categories than can be included in this ordinal 
variable: Physical integrity rights, which is an additive variable of torture, extrajudicial 
killings, political prisoners and disappearances, was coded on a scale from 0 to 8 where 0 
means that all rights are violated and 8 means all rights are respected. Civil and political 
rights, which is an additive of independent judiciary, freedom of association, freedom of 
foreign and domestic movement, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and electoral self-
determination was coded on a scale from 0 to 14 where 0 means all rights are violated and 14 
means all rights are respected. Social and economic rights, were coded a little differently. 
First, Workers’ rights were coded on a scale from 0, meaning severely restricted, to 2, 
meaning fully protected (CIRI coding Guide 2013, 65). Secondly, the political and economic 
rights of women are coded from 0, no rights guaranteed by law, to 2 meaning equality is 
guaranteed by law but an additional code is created for the cases in which equality is 
guaranteed by law and in practice. This category was coded with 3. These different categories 
are separately included in the analysis. When all the categories of violations are cumulated, a 
sum category of total violations can be created which ranges from 0 to 30 and indicates the 
amount of total rights that is respected as has been mentioned before.   
The variable of neighbourhood interests was operationalized through area codes 
addressed by the EU. The EU has 16 countries that are included in a specific ‘neighbourhood’ 
policy. Those countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine. 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territory, 
Syria and Tunisia. These countries were coded in a binary variable with a (1) on this variable 
and the other countries with a (0).  
The domestic stability of a country has been assessed through two indicators. The first 
is the amount of freedom in a country. FreedomHouse distinguished three categories in which 
countries can be grouped: free (3), partly free (2) and not free (1). Second, the poverty status 
of a country can be indicated with the Human Development Index. Data on these indicators 
were derived from the FreedomHouse and the UNDP databases.  
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Dependent Variable: Human Rights policy 
Before the effect of economic interests on the human rights policy of the EU is assessed, some 
background information on EU policy making to address human rights is provided for the 
sake of understanding what this policy exactly implies. In order to address human rights, the 
EU has several instruments at its disposal to promote those rights: diplomatic instruments, 
aid, conditionality and sanctions. These different instruments will be discussed shortly below.  
 By means of diplomatic interaction, the EU makes several statements and démarches 
on human rights situations in the world. This is mostly done under the heading of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Another diplomatic instrument is the participation in 
human rights dialogues. Through these dialogues, the EU attempts to convince third countries 
of the value of human rights protection through the process of socialization (Fierro 2003, 
102). A more material instrument to promote human rights is the provision of aid to support 
local human rights initiatives and governments to improve their human rights records. This 
aid is provided through several budgets such as the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) or the European Development Fund (EDF) (Annual Report 2012). 
However, those funds are purely financial instruments since it does not necessarily contain 
any elements of political dialogue or political conditionality. Despite the fact of positive 
review, the EIDHR does not operate in the countries that need it the most, such as Iran and 
Iraq, which have a very poor human rights record (Smith 2008, 133).  
A third mechanism that can be used by the EU to address human rights is the 
implementation of conditionality in economic agreements. This mechanism uses a top-down 
approach in order to address human rights in a third country. The benefits received from 
cooperation are made conditional on the respect of human rights. This implies that in order to 
receive such benefits, a third country has to live up to a specific condition and if it turns out 
that they fail to live up to it later on, the benefits can be withdrawn. This mechanism of 
conditionality can be found in trade and association agreements, additional trade preferences, 
technical and development assistance, diplomatic recognition and other instruments. An 
example of such agreement is the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in which the ‘more for more’ 
principle is applied. Countries that show most progress are granted with more financial 
support to enhance incentives for further development (Annual Report on Human Rights 
2012).  
However, Smith (2008) shows that the EU has agreements or is negotiating for 
agreement with a great amount of countries that have very poor human rights records. 
Examples of these countries are: Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, 
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Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (Smith 2008, 128). This finding sharply contrasts the constant 
calls of the European Parliament to ensure, before signing an agreement with a third country, 
that this country lives up to the human rights standards at the moment of signing (PE 362.667, 
16). These contrast may imply that in some decisions on agreements with third countries, 
human rights conditions are not considered which seriously reduces the credibility of these ex 
ante instruments of conditionality. 
After signing, the EU can also enact ex-post conditionality in the form of a human 
rights clause that is included in every agreement since 1995. This instrument ensures 
conditionality on human rights when an agreement is in force. The clause gives the EU the 
right to suspend its cooperation with a third country that does not live up to the conditions of 
the agreement. Complying to human rights standards is one of these conditions. The same 
mechanism is also used to ensure conditionality in the provision of aid to third countries. The 
human rights clause is often considered an important instrument for enabling the EU to 
address human rights. Remarkably, Smith and Tocci (2007) show that the most suspensions 
or reductions of agreements have taken place in marginal states (Smith 2008, 130). Tocci 
illustrates the lack of ex-post conditionality in the case of Israel where no sanctions in the 
form of suspension of agreements on the basis of the human rights clause are imposed (Tocci 
2007, 116). In addition, Takacs (2010) argues that human rights clauses contain very vague 
terms that cause conditions to be open to multiple interpretation (Takacs 2010, 105). 
Furthermore, several civil and military missions also included a human rights objective which 
mainly focused on capacity-building. The most costly instrument for the EU to use are so 
called ‘sticks’. This instrument has the purpose to punish the target country substantially for 
violating human rights and has the most severe consequences for the target states of all 
instruments (Warkotsch 2010, 83). By assessing the use of these instruments, a preference of 
the EU for positive measures can be indicated (Fierro 2003, 105). In addition, since the 
1990’s, a shift towards more softer measures of dialogue instead of more pressing measures 
can be distinguished (Smith 2008, 159; Börzel and Risse 2004, 8).  
As said, the EU has several instruments at its disposal to address human rights in its 
policy towards third countries. These instruments can have an economic or political character 
and can thus be divided in two categories. The first category contains diplomatic instruments 
such as declarations which are unilateral statements of the EU on a human rights situation in a 
country. The target country is not obliged to respond to these statements which makes the 
instrument the least costly and the least risky for the EU to use. Another diplomatic 
instrument is the human rights dialogue. In such a dialogue, the target state is obliged to 
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respond to human rights claims of which the intention is to eventually persuade the target 
country of the value of human rights. Those dialogues often do not do much harm to third 
countries since they remain on a rhetorical basis. Thus, diplomatic instruments are relatively 
safe to use because the costs for both parties are low (Warkotsch 2010, 82). Instruments with 
an economic character impose more costs on the target country. Examples of such economic 
instruments are conditionality through a human rights clause or a conditional PTA as 
described by Hafner-Burton (Hafner-Burton 2005, 595). In addition, human rights violations 
can be punished trough 'sticks' which entail the withdrawal of aid, financial sanctions and 
economic sanctions such as embargoes. ‘Sticks’ are considered to be most costly because 
punishing a country is most likely to lead to a reassessment of the bilateral relationship by the 
target country (Warkotsch 2010, 83). On the contrary, an increase in the human rights record 
of a country can be rewarded by ‘carrots’ such as aid provided by the EIDHR in order to 
support human rights activism and strengthen the capacity of a state to protect human rights. 
‘Carrots’ also have consequences for the target country but these are regarded less severe than 
in the case of ‘sticks’. In my analysis, these categories of my dependent variable will be 
ranked from least costly to most costly in order to asses the harshness of the instruments used 
in the EU human rights policy. 
 
Measuring Human Rights Policy 
According to its Annual Report of 2011, the EU has human rights interaction with 101 
countries in the world. The different mechanisms used towards these countries can be coded 
according to the severity of their consequences for the violation of human rights by third 
countries. Based on the theoretical assumptions of the severity of these measures, I 
constructed an order that ranges from diplomatic measures as least severe to sanctions as most 
severe measures. Before the order of this variable is further elaborated, an overview is 
provided on the way the data of the dependent variable was coded. The order of the numbers 
of the coding was determined by the order of distinguishing a new category. This does not say 
anything about the eventual order of harshness of these instruments. The recoding of the 
eventual order will be discussed later. 
First of all, there has to be some action of the EU addressing human rights towards 
third countries. If there were no instruments used, the country was coded with a (0). As has 
been said, unilateral declarations do not expect third countries to respond to the condemnation 
of their human rights situation and were therefore coded with a (1). The nature of the 
declarations can be either positive or negative. For investigating my hypothesis, this research 
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solely focuses on the negative declarations. Data on declarations made to different third 
countries are derived from Annual Reports on Human Rights and the database of the EEAS 
providing all the statements made by the High Representative on behalf of the EU1. The 
human rights dialogue is considered to be somewhat more costly since the third countries are 
obliged to respond to the accusations made by the EU. However, for the implementation of 
this instrument, two levels have to be distinguished. First a political dialogue can take place at 
state level. These dialogues were coded with (2). Furthermore, the EU also conducts 
dialogues with non-state actors on the civil society level. These dialogues were coded with 
(10). The nature of the dialogue can vary as well. The most formal nature of the dialogue is 
one on a structural basis which is always on the state level so these dialogues were also coded 
under (2). This category thus contains dialogues at the level of the state that take place on a 
structural basis. Furthermore, dialogues take place under the establishment of several 
cooperation agreements. These dialogues were coded with (16). However, there are also less 
formal dialogues that take place more occasionally in the form of consultations. These 
consultations were coded with (17) on state level and (18) on the local level (Annual Report 
on Human Rights 2010, 12). Data of this category were gathered from the EU regulations on 
the Human Rights Dialogues and the Annual Reports on Human Rights. The EU also uses 
other diplomatic instruments with a more technical component such as, Electoral Observation 
Missions (EOM), coded with (6), seminars and trainings, coded with (7), conflict resolutions 
missions, coded with (8), judicial and human rights monitoring (13) and (14) and fact finding 
missions, coded with (15). In addition, the EU has developed a local human rights strategy for 
different countries to make the EU’s approach more adjusted to individual situations (Annual 
Report on Human Rights 2010, 11). When the EU has such local strategy in place for a 
specific third country, it was coded with (12). All these instruments do interfere in a specific 
situation, not merely by dialogue but are also focusing on capacity building. Principally, these 
instruments are accompanied by some form of dialogue or provision of aid.  
Since the instruments with an economic character have more severe consequences for 
the third country, those instruments will be placed in a higher category. The rewarding of 
efforts of human rights protection do have economic consequences for the third country yet 
they are considered the least severe since they have a positive approach and were therefore 
coded with (3). However, several categories of aid can be distinguished. As discussed above, 
the provision of aid can be directed especially towards supporting a specific capacity building 
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programme. When this is explicitly mentioned, these measures were coded with (11). Rather 
than to the government, aid can also be provided to support NGO’s and human rights 
defenders. When this was explicitly mentioned in the Annual Reports, the measure was coded 
with (19).  
The next instrument in line of harshness is the imposing of conditionality. Initially, the 
existence of conditionality will be measured through the consequences of a human rights 
clause in the preferential trade agreements with third countries. As the EU claims, a human 
rights clause is included in all trade and cooperation agreements with third countries (EEAS 
2014). Therefore, conditionality is coded on the basis of whether the EU has ever acted upon 
the clause by suspending an agreement with a third country. When the EU does have a clause 
but decides not to act upon it, it can be regarded the same as not having a human rights clause. 
This way of coding will also account for the fact that, regardless of what the EU officially 
states, it does not have a human rights clause with its main trading partners. The cases in 
which the human rights clause had consequences were coded with (4). Additionally, positive 
conditionality is maintained under the ‘more for more’ principle in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. When such instances occurred, they were also included in this 
category. Data on this category were gathered from the different Action Plans and Guidelines 
for the promotion of human rights, provided by the European External Action Service, and 
secondary literature on the actual consequences of the human rights clause (Smith 2008, 
Saltnes 2013, Miller 2004, Hazelzet 2004). Finally, the category of instruments that is 
supposed to impose the most economic pain on a third country are the so called ‘sticks’. 
These sticks include the suspension of aid and economic sanctions such as a trade or arms 
embargo. These measures were coded with (5). However, there are also sanctions which are 
not directed at the entire government of the third country but only at specific individuals 
responsible for the human rights violations. These personal sanctions were coded with (9). 
Data will be derived from Council of the EU reports on sanctions or restrictive measures and 
secondary literature (Hazelzet 2005, Smith 2008). Evidently, the EU uses more than one of 
the described above instruments. Therefore, the different codes can exist synchronously for 
each country.  
 Eventually, this data was recoded in three ways in order to be analysed in my three 
models. For my first model, all the cases in which the EU used any of these measures were 
coded with (1) and the cases in which no measures were used or data was missing were coded 
with (0). For the count version of my dependent variable, the number of instances in which 
any of the measures mentioned above were used was counted. This count variable ranges 
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from 0 when no measure was taken to 10 which was the maximum amount of measures taken. 
For the ordinal version of my dependent variable, the data was recoded into three categories. 
The first category, coded with (1), included all measures that had an economic character like 
the provision of aid or technical assistance through different instruments such as EIDHR or 
EDF. The second category, coded with (2), included all measures that had a conditional 
character, such as the suspension of aid or a trade agreement on the basis of the human rights 
clause but also the more for more principle that was maintained under the Neighbourhood 
policy. The third country, coded with (3), contained the measures that were theoretically 
considered the harshest, such as sanctions.  
One possibility of bias that has to be taken into account is the fact that the Annual 
Report of Human Rights is based on contributions of the different EU delegations spread over 
the world. As a result, several measures are phrased in different ways which may cause a 
misunderstanding of two measures being the same or being similar due to different ways of 
reporting them. However, when a measure differed significantly from all others, a new code 
was added to the dataset.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis as well 
as the effect they are expected to have on the implementation of human rights measures by the 
EU. Regarding my theory, the variables concerning trade and stability are expected to 
increase the amount and harshness of the human rights measures taken in a country.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Full dataset is available on request 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Indicator Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max Expected 
effect on DV 
Total Trade (log) 3,0204 1,35959 0 6,54 + 
PTA ,19 ,390 0 1 + 
Agriculture (log) 4,4145 ,17178 0 4,62 + 
Raw Materials (log) 4,5970 ,16881 0 4,68 + 
Energy supplies (log) 5,6102 ,20402 0 5,63 + 
Violation Index 16,07 7,090 0 29 - 
Physical Integrity violations 4,62 2,318 0 8 - 
Civil Liberty violations 7,74 4,367 0 14 - 
Worker’s rights violations ,57 ,556 0 2 - 
Women’s economic rights violations 1,21 ,839 0 3 - 
HDI ,63924 ,164023 ,289 ,955 + 
GSP 1,28 1,044 0 3 + 
Neighbourhood ,07 ,258 0 1 + 
Freedom  2,09 ,795 1 3 - 
 
Case selection, Data and Design 
Saltnes (2013) criticizes authors such as DelBiondo, Smith and Crawford for only testing 
cases in which economic or strategic interests were already known to be present. Due to a 
selection bias concerning only the cases in which no negative measures were taken but several 
rights were violated, the hypotheses in these studies were not pursued to be falsified (Saltnes 
2013, 6). In order to rule out this selection bias in my research I want to take into account the 
full population of countries with which the EU has economic interaction, regardless to what 
extent. The EU has economic interaction with 210 partners. As indicated above, it has human 
rights interaction with 101 countries. However, I also want to include the countries to which 
the EU has no human rights interaction because it will further strengthen the holistic character 
of my research and prevent such criticism provided by Saltnes.  
In order to conduct my research, I will use a quantitative large-n analysis. This will be 
done through a statistical analysis in order to determine whether the assumed inconsistency in 
EU human rights policy is actually present. I will do this by running three separate models in 
which I will triangulate different dimensions of the dependent variable. The benefit of this 
triangulation is that it will produce a more nuanced view on the human rights policy of the 
EU. The first model will evaluate whether there is an inconsistency in the application of 
human rights measures by the EU to third countries at all. The second model will assess 
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whether there is an inconsistency, determined by trade, in the amount of measures the EU 
uses against third countries and the third model will assess whether an inconsistency is 
present in the supposed harshness of the measures used to third countries. Several control 
variables are introduces as well in order to see whether the presence of an inconsistency can 
be explained by economic interests, as is assumed, or whether there are other factors that 
might be at play in determining the amount and harshness of measures the EU uses. 
Subsequently, different predictor variables will be added and removed in order to get a 
comprehensive image of the factors that are influencing the EU in the implementation of its 
human rights policy. 
The quantitative studies that have already been done on this subject, are at least 10 
years old and still concern a limited amount of cases. Therefore, I would like to collect the 
most recent data from the past four years to get an up to date analysis of all cases around the 
world. By considering the past four years I also attempt to rule out policy differences due to 
inter-institutional changes after implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, the EU has 
updated several human rights instruments in 2009 so in order to keep my dependent variable 
consistent, 2009 will be the first year of data. My unit of analysis will be the human rights 
policy on a yearly basis. The same goes for my data of my independent and control variables.  
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The effect of Total Trade on the Human Rights Policy of the EU 
 
The next section uses logistic regression analysis to test the effect of trade on the human 
rights policy of the EU. The main purpose of logistic regression analysis is determining the 
impact of multiple independent variables on the membership of one or the other category of 
the dependent variable. From the 1123 cases under consideration, the EU has intervened in 
519 cases over the past four years and in 604 cases, the EU does not interfere at all. In order 
to check the robustness of my findings, the effect will be tested in three different analyses. By 
incrementally increasing the variation in the dependent variable, the relationship between 
trade and human rights policy is tested from three different but related angles in order to get a 
nuanced insight in the dynamics of this relationship. The first analysis tests the binary version 
of the dependent variable through binary logistic regression analysis to see whether the 
amount of trade has an effect on whether the EU interferes in certain countries at all. This 
approach forms a threshold to see whether the link that is made in the literature between trade 
and human rights is actually valid. The second analysis includes a count version of the 
dependent variable. This variable counts the number of measures taken when the EU 
interferes in order to increase the variance in my dependent variable. The analysis of the count 
variable also tests my hypothesis (H1) that the EU is likely to interfere with more measures in 
more important countries that in less important countries. A Poisson regression analysis is 
used to see whether the effect of the amount of trade still holds when the amount of measures 
is taken into account. The third model extends the approach of the dependent variable and 
tests my second hypothesis (H2) which states that the EU is likely to interfere with harsher 
measures in economic important countries than in less important countries. This is done by 
analysing the effect of the amount of trade through ordinal regression on the ordinal version 
of the dependent variable that will range from 1 (least severe) to 3 (most severe).3 When the 
effect of total trade on the human rights policy of the EU holds in all three analyses, the effect 
can be considered a robust effect.  
Initially, all relevant control variables were included but ‘Women’s Political Rights’ 
turned out to be redundant and was therefore left out of the analysis. Furthermore, a selection 
is made between the control variables of types of trade because of a high correlation between 
the different product groups. Yet a test for collinearity between these predictors did not show 
a serious level of multicollinearity. Eventually, the categories agriculture, raw materials and 
                                                 
3
 In order to include the multiple categories of the ordinal variable for one single case, the data had to be stacked 
for the analysis of this ordinal variable.  
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energy produces are included in the analysis because of their theoretical relevance for the 
explanation of EU human rights interference. The results of the analyses are shown in tables 
2,3 and 4. 
The results of the binary regression analysis are shown in table 2. First of all, the table 
shows three models which each include different variables. Model 3 shows the model with all 
variables included while model 1 and 2 exclude respectively the freedom variable and the 
main independent variable of Total Trade. I have chosen to distinguish between those two 
variables to control for the fact that they might measure the same variance. However, when 
we look at the Log-Likelihood of the three models, we see that including or excluding these 
variables does not make much difference for the explaining value of the model. Table 2 does 
show that model 3, which includes both variables, shows the lowest likelihood value which 
means that this model leaves the lowest amount of observations unexplained. Thus, model 3 
including all variables forms the best fit. The same conclusion must be drawn when we look 
at the Pseudo R2 values of the three models.  
The analysis of the dependent variable of Human Rights Policy as a binary variable, 
which measures whether or not the EU applied measures at all to certain countries, shows a 
fairly significant effect of the main independent variable of Total Trade. This effect indicates 
a positive relationship between the main independent variable of Total Trade and the binary 
dependent variable of Human Rights Policy. In the full model, this relationship is indicated by 
an odds ratio of 1.681. This means that the odds of interference to address human rights 
violations increases by 1.681 when the total trade increases by one unit. Looking at the 
unstandardized values of this variable, it shows that the values are indicated in billions of 
euro’s. Thus, an increase by one unit actually means one billion euro’s. In other words, when 
the amount of trade goes up by one billion euro’s, the EU is 68% more likely to interfere. This 
is an interesting result given the fact that the conclusions of existing research have mainly 
shown the opposite effect. However, the binary result of more likelihood of interference does 
not say anything about the severity of the interference and the interpretation that the EU cares 
more about the situation in countries with which it has a lot of economic business seems 
plausible.  
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Table 2: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis 
Variables Model 1 
(Excl. Freedom) 
Exp(B)       (se) 
Model 2  
(Excl. Total Trade) 
Exp(B)      (se) 
Model 3 
(Full model) 
Exp(B)        (se) 
Total Trade (log) 1,657        (,209)* - 1,681        (,211)* 
PTA 1,084        (,335) 1,000       (,328) 1,215        (,343) 
Agriculture (log) ,132          (10,321) ,819         (9,736) ,063          (10,279) 
Raw Materials (log) ,000          (18,545)*** ,000         (16,795)*** ,000          (18,530)*** 
Energy supplies (log) 8,35E+12 (14,546)* 2,46E+12(15,012)+ 2,79E+13 (14,174)* 
Violation Index 1,638        (,311) 1,910       (,304)* 1,767        (,339)+ 
Physical Integrity violations ,356          (,325)** ,277         (,316)*** ,327          (,351)** 
Civil Liberty violations ,562          (,324)+ ,512         (,316)* ,564          (,356) 
Worker’s rights violations ,302          (,457)* ,318         (,456)* ,318          (,480)* 
Women’s economic rights 
violations 
,319          (,422)* ,281         (,415)** ,307          (,452)** 
HDI 1,628        (1,569) 6,068       (1,480) 1,707        (1,570) 
GSP 1,089        (,200) ,942         (,198) 1,057        (,203) 
Neighbourhood 5,064        (1,062) 5,874       (1,059)+ 5,270        (1,060) 
Freedom  - ,566         (,333)+ ,538          (,338)+ 
    
N 442 440 439 
Log-Likelihood 331,857 334,605 327,615 
LR Chi2 
df 
208,805 
13 
201,250 
13 
207,532 
14 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) .533 .521 .535 
Notes: Controls are Agriculture, Raw Materials, Energy supplies, violation index, physical integrity violations, 
civil liberty violations, worker’s rights violations, women’s economic rights violations, HDI, GSP, 
Neighbourhood and Freedom.  
+ p > 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p > 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
   
 This interpretation can be further supported by the significant positive effect of two 
control variables considering type of trade. The trade categories that are significant are raw 
materials, and energy supplies. Especially the trade category of energy supplies shows a very 
high odds ratio yet the effect is moderately significant. This can be interpreted by saying that 
the EU is 2,79E+13 times more likely to interfere in countries when the amount of energy 
goods traded with a country goes up with 1 billion euro’s. This extraordinary high number is 
explained by the extensive amount of money that this variable measures. The trade category 
of raw materials is also significant but this is a one to one effect.  
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 Additionally, some other control variables are also significant. The control variable of 
the amount of violations in a country shows a moderately significant effect with an odds ratio 
of 1,767. This means that when the protection of human rights by countries increases by one 
point on the 30-point scale, the EU is 76,7% more likely to interfere. This is an interesting 
result because it would mean that the EU does not address human rights in the most severe 
cases. However, when the rights that are violated in a country are specified in different type of 
rights we see a significant inverse effect for most of the categories. Furthermore, the Freedom 
variable is shown to have an inverse effect on the application of human rights measures. The 
odds ratio of this effect is .567 which means that with an increase of the Freedom variable 
with one category, the log odds of freedom are expected to increase with .567. In other words, 
the EU is less likely to interfere in countries where more freedom is guaranteed. This result is 
further specified in the second analysis. 
The analysis of the count variable, table 3, indicates that the positive effect of total 
trade on the amount of human rights measures taken still holds and is even more significant 
than the binary dependent variable. The Total Trade variable in the full model shows an odds 
ratio of 1.364 which means that the odds of the amount of measures taken increases by 1.364 
when the total trade increases by one unit. In other words, the EU is 36% more likely to 
impose more measures when the amount of goods traded with a country increases with one 
billion euro. Thus, an increase in intensity of the trade relation, indicated by the amount of 
trade, simultaneously increases the likelihood of imposing more human rights measures. The 
variable controlling for Preferential Trade Agreements supports this finding since table 3 
shows a significant inverse effect of not having a PTA on the amount of human rights 
measures taken. This result becomes even more interesting when the trade flows are specified 
for different product groups. Table 3 shows that there is an inverse relationship between the 
trade in raw materials and the amount of human rights measures taken. This effect is highly 
significant yet it is very minimal. The odds ratio of 0,0000278 indicates that when the trade in 
raw materials increases with one billion euro, the likelihood of an increase in the amount of 
measures taken is 0,0000278 times higher than before the increase. Thus, a very minimal 
effect.  
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Table 3: Poisson Regresssion analysis of the Count variable 
Variables Model 1 
(Excl. Freedom) 
Exp(B)       (se) 
Model 2  
(Excl. Total Trade) 
Exp(B)      (se) 
Model 3 
(Full model) 
Exp(B)         (se) 
Total Trade (log) 1,358         (,0557)*** - 1,364         (,0560)*** 
PTA4 ,767           (,0815)** ,796           (,0810)** ,763           (,0818)** 
Agriculture (log) 1,645         (1,6859) 1,025         (1,8767) 1,796         (1,6855) 
Raw Materials (log) 5,96E-005 (2,1973)*** 1,84E-005 (2,5103)*** 2,78E-005 (2,2478)*** 
Energy supplies (log) 1168,823   (3,1172)* 82,275       (3,0406) 1577,886   (3,1355)* 
Violation Index 1,060         (,0709) 1,125         (,0687)+ 1,057         (,0712) 
Physical Integrity violations ,838           (,0765)* ,758           (,0728)*** ,839           (,0767)* 
Civil Liberty violations ,886           (,0744) ,836           (,0725)* ,894           (,0746) 
Worker’s rights violations ,817           (,1052)* ,830           (,1052)* ,844           (,1063) 
Women’s economic rights 
violations 
,863           (,0995) ,809           (,0964)* ,881           (,1003) 
HDI ,180           (,4012)*** ,591           (,3509) ,200           (,4013)*** 
No GSP  
GSP  
GSP + 
EBA 
1,646         (,1328)*** 
,855           (,1040) 
1,757         (,1403)*** 
1. 
1,650         (,1309)*** 
,922           (,1046) 
1,516         (,1384)** 
1. 
1,650         (,1323)*** 
,873           (,1043) 
1,703         (,1409)*** 
1. 
Neighbourhood Policy5 ,869           (,1035) ,853         (,1039) ,882           (,1035) 
Not Free 
Partly Free 
Free 
- 1,137       (,1522) 
1,214       (,1199) 
1. 
1,205         (,1523) 
1,266         (,1199)* 
1. 
    
N 442 440 440 
Log-Likelihood -724, 956 -737,469 -721,699 
LR Chi2 488,343 507,922 483,949 
AIC 
BIC 
1481,913 
1547,373 
1508,937 
1578,413 
1479,399 
1552,961 
Notes: Controls are Agriculture, Raw Materials, Energy supplies, violation index, physical integrity violations, 
civil liberty violations, worker’s rights violations, women’s economic rights violations, HDI, GSP, 
Neighbourhood and Freedom.  
+ p > 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p > 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
                                                 
4
 Due to the binary character of this variable, the odds ratio presented in the table is reflecting the odds ratio for 
the lowest category (=0) compared to the higher category (=1). In this case, this the lowest category considers 
the category ‘No PTA’. 
5
 Due to the binary character of this variable, the odds ratio presented in the table is reflecting the odds ratio for 
the lowest category (=0) compared to the higher category (=1). In this case, this the lowest category considers 
the category ‘No Neighbourhood Policy’. 
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Contrarily, the effect of energy supplies, is moderately significant but very high. The 
odds ratio of 1577,886 indicates that with every one billion euro increase in trade of energy 
goods, the likelihood of more measures imposed increases with 1577,886%. This result tends 
to undermine the argument made by DelBiondo (2011) and Smith (2008) that trade in oil 
would lead to less severe human rights interference because the EU does not want to disturb 
these valuable trade relations. On the contrary, this result does support my theory of the EU 
striving to achieve milieu goals especially in trade relationships that contain valuable goods 
such as energy supplies. However, the amount of measures taken does not say anything about 
the severity of the measures. So when the EU only interferes in terms of dialogue or provision 
of aid, this might not be considered as threatening to the maintenance of the trade flows of 
energy goods with those countries.  
Additionally, table 3 shows some interesting results from distinguishing between 
including and excluding freedom and total trade. First of all, we see that the significance of 
the control variables concerning the amount of rights violated vary across the three models. 
When the main independent variable of total trade is excluded, more violation variables 
become significant. This effect can be explained by the high levels of collinearity between the 
main independent variable and the violation control variables, especially the violation index 
and civil liberty rights. However, when those variables are dropped from the analysis, the 
effect of total trade on the amount of human rights measures applied hardly changes and the 
AIC values of the three models in table 3, which measure the goodness-of-fit,  show that the 
full model has the best fit.  
Compared to the binary analysis, some remarkable changes have occurred in the 
predicting value of the control variables. First of all, the count analysis shows that the effect 
of the total amount of rights violated is not significant anymore when the variation on human 
rights policy is increased by the amount of measures taken. However, the different types of 
rights still remain significant with an inverse effect, though the magnitude of the effect has 
slightly decreased. Furthermore, the second model shows that the Human Development Index 
(HDI) variable has suddenly become highly significant with an inverse effect. This indicates 
that the increase of HDI leads to a significant decrease in the amount of human rights 
measures taken. This makes perfect sense since the EU is likely to interfere in countries with 
low development index in order to improve the situation, including human rights, mostly in 
the form of providing aid. However, we still cannot say something about the validity of the 
argument made by Warkotsch (2010) that severe measures are considered to be less effective 
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in poorer countries given their destabilizing effect since the count variable did not include 
severity of measures. This will be included in table 4. 
Another remarkable effect among the control variables is the difference in significance 
between the categories of GSP status and Freedom score. For GSP status, table 3 shows a 
highly significant effect for GSP status 0 of 1,650 which means that the amount of measures 
taken by the EU towards countries with a GSP status of 0 is 65% higher than for the countries 
with GSP status 3. Translated into the meaning of these categories, we can say that the EU is 
1.667 times more likely to impose human rights measures towards countries which it did not 
include in its General System of Preferences than towards countries that have access to the 
EU market extending to Everything but Arms (EBA). Likewise, the likelihood of imposing 
more measures on countries that have a GSP status of 2, which means a GSP+ status that is 
dependent on the ratification of specific human rights treaties, is 1.703 times higher than on 
countries that have an EBA status. A more interesting but moderate significant effect is seen 
between the categories of the Freedom score. Freedom score 2, which includes the partly free 
countries, shows a significant likelihood of imposing more measures that is 1.266 times 
higher than in countries with a Freedom score of 3, which are the Free countries. This can be 
interpreted theoretically by the fact that measures are considered to have more effect in 
countries in de middle rather that in stable consolidated democracies or completely autocratic 
regimes, as has been discussed by the argument of Moravcsik (2000) in the theoretical section 
of this thesis. 
So far, tables 2 and 3, show significant evidence of the effect of trade interests on the 
human rights policy of the EU. When the amount of trade increases, the EU is more likely to 
interfere in different ways in a country. However, the increase in human rights measures taken 
can also be explained by other variables such as HDI, GSP and Freedom status. In the next 
table, the analysis of the ordinal variable of human rights policy will be discussed. The 
assumption of  the different case studies that the EU imposes harsher measures on the 
countries in which it has less trade interests will then finally be tested.  
When we look at the Nagelkerke’s R2 of the three models in table 4, we see that these 
models only explain a very limited part of the variation compared to the models in table 2. 
Therefore, conclusions from these results should be drawn carefully. When we look at the full 
model, table 4 shows that there is no significant effect of the amount of trade on human rights 
interference anymore. The only variables that do remain significant are the inverse effect of 
the HDI variable, and the non-free and partly free categories of the freedom variable. 
Additionally, the variable of Neighbourhood policy has become significant in this analysis. It 
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shows a very small, moderately significant inverse effect which means that the EU is less 
likely to impose harsher measures on countries that are not included in the Neighbourhood 
policy than to countries that are included which supports the statement by Warkotsch (2010) 
that the harshest measures are imposed on neighbouring countries in order to create security. 
This finding also moderately supports my theory of milieu goals since these goals also 
consider the direct environment of a country. As Wolfers argues, milieu goals can also be 
achieved in an attempt to cease the threats to national possessions (Wolfers 1962, 76). Yet, 
the parameter estimate of -,362 indicates that the effect is very small. 
However, table 4 shows far more interesting results on the effect of several variables 
on the harshness of the measures imposed by the EU. Most importantly, the PTA variable 
shows a significant negative effect for the category ‘no PTA’ which means that the EU is also 
less likely to impose harsher measures to countries with which it does not have a Preferential 
Trade Agreement. In other words, the EU is more concerned to interfere with harsher 
measures in countries with which it has a more intense trade relationship through the 
establishment of Preferential Trade Agreements. This can be explained by the fact that PTA’s 
often include human rights clauses which form a legal basis to suspend the agreement when 
human rights are violated. Despite the fact that my main independent variable of total trade 
does not have a significant effect on the ordinal version of my dependent variable anymore, 
the independent variable, PTA, that also indicates the intensity of a trade relationship does 
show support for my hypothesis that the EU is more likely to interfere with harsher measures 
in countries with which it has an intense trade relationship.  
Furthermore, my argument is supported by the remained significant effect of the non-
free and partly free countries as well as the HDI variable. All these variables indicate that the 
EU is more likely to interfere with harsher measures when the situation in countries is less 
stable and developed, compared to countries that are more free and more developed. This 
provides a contrasting view to the argument of Warkotsch (2010) about the destabilizing 
effect of harsh measures on poor and unstable countries. My findings provide more evidence 
for the willingness of the EU to use all the measures at its disposal to create a stable 
environment for its trading relationships and hence, in the worst cases where the most work is 
still to be done, the EU uses the heaviest instruments.  
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Table 4: Ordinal Regression analysis 
Variables Model 1 
(Excl. Freedom) 
Estimate       (se) 
Model 2  
(Excl. Total Trade) 
Exp(B)      (se) 
Model 3 
(Full model) 
Estimate         (se) 
Total Trade (log)    ,073 (,118) -    ,104    (,119) 
PTA6   -,391 (,163)**   -,406 (,163)*    -,421 (,164)* 
Agriculture (log)  4,992 (3,947)   4,280 (3,888)  4,460 (3,847) 
Raw Materials (log) -4,942 (4,979) -7,507 (5,192) -7,316 (5,110) 
Energy supplies (log)  6,738 (7,150)  8,515 (7,298)  9,514 (7,463) 
Violation Index   -,248 (,159)   -,191 (,156)  -,216 (,159) 
Physical Integrity violations    ,199 (,171)    ,117 (,165)   ,154 (,171) 
Civil Liberty violations    ,232 (,166)    ,232 (,162)   ,258 (,166) 
Worker’s rights violations    ,320 (,230)    ,357 (,230)   ,359 (,231) 
Women’s economic rights 
violations 
   ,373 (,210)+    ,296 (,206)   ,329 (,211) 
HDI -3,146 (,854)*** -2,564 (,777)** -2,900 (,869)** 
No GSP  
GSP  
GSP + 
EBA 
    ,312 (,278) 
   -,129 (,226) 
    ,316 (,289) 
0. 
   ,422 (,280) 
  -,068 (,225) 
   ,318 (,288) 
0. 
    ,416 (,280) 
  -,098 (,228)         
    ,354 (,291) 
0. 
Neighbourhood Policy7   -,388 (,208)+   -,376 (,211)+    -,362 (,212)+ 
Not Free 
Partly Free 
Free 
-    ,943 (,313)** 
   ,430 (,247)+ 
0. 
    ,968 (,315)** 
    ,451 (,249)+ 
0. 
    
N 1019 1019 1019 
Log-Likelihood 1112,601 1102,510 1101,747 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) .058 .069 .070 
LR Chi2 1060,439 
 
1068,024 
 
1099,887 
Notes: Controls are Agriculture, Raw Materials, Energy supplies, violation index, physical integrity violations, 
civil liberty violations, worker’s rights violations, women’s economic rights violations, HDI, GSP, 
Neighbourhood and Freedom.  
+ p > 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p > 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
                                                 
6
 Due to the binary character of this variable, the odds ratio presented in the table is reflecting the odds ratio for 
the lowest category (=0) compared to the higher category (=1). In this case, this the lowest category considers 
the category ‘No PTA’. 
 
7
 Due to the binary character of this variable, the odds ratio presented in the table is reflecting the odds ratio for 
the lowest category (=0) compared to the higher category (=1). In this case, this the lowest category considers 
the category ‘No Neighbourhood Policy’. 
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These findings all make sense when they are seen in the light of the EU striving for 
milieu goals by improving the economic stability in the countries with which it has a trade 
relationship. Therefore, the conclusions about economic inconsistency drawn from previous 
case study research can be nuanced by the findings of my quantitative analysis. An 
inconsistency might still be present on a case-by-case basis yet it cannot be established when 
the whole population of EU trading partners is under consideration.  
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Conclusion 
 
The inconsistency in the EU's human rights policy has been studied in many research. Several 
authors have mainly studied this inconsistency through case studies and those studies led to 
the same conclusion, economic interests are valued above human rights interests. Despite the 
fact that this general consensus in current literature exists, my research shows that several 
theoretical and methodological misconceptions have led to invalid conclusions. First of all, 
the theoretical approach of the EU human rights policy being function of cost-benefit analysis 
of the EU tends to overlook broader goals the EU is striving to achieve. Secondly, the 
selection bias of previous research towards cases in which the inconsistency in human rights 
policy already appeared to be present, led to conclusions that cannot be generalized for the 
whole population of countries the EU trades with.  
In this thesis, I have attempted to refine the analysis of the human rights policy of the 
EU by assessing these conclusions, drawn from case studies, in a quantitative analysis to see 
if they are applicable to all the countries the EU trades with. To guide my analysis, I 
developed a theory that stressed the argument that is ignored in existing literature. Rather than 
short-term possession goals, the EU is striving for a long term stability of the environment in 
which it conducts its trade relationships.  Therefore, it is likely to expect the EU to use more 
intense measures when more trade interests are at stake in order to create a stable environment 
to preserve its valuable trade relations. Accordingly, I constructed two hypotheses that 
assumed that the EU uses more and harsher measures to address human rights violations by 
more important trading partners than by less important trading partners. In order to test my 
hypotheses I have constructed a main independent variable, economic interests, for explaining 
my dependent variable, human rights policy. The variance on economic interests was 
indicated by import, export and the existence of a PTA. The indicators of my dependent 
variable were the different instruments the EU has at its disposal to address human rights in 
third countries. In order to control for other explanations, several control variables were 
included in my research to control for the amount of violations, type of violations, 
neighbourhood interests and effectiveness through domestic stability which possibly influence 
the instruments used by the EU to address human rights violations. To assess the explaining 
value of my independent variable on my dependent variable, I have used logistic regression 
analysis to see to what extent economic interests determine human rights interference.   
Despite the conclusions of many case studies on this subject, the quantitative analysis 
in this thesis does not support the assumed negative effect of trade interests on the EU’s 
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human rights policy. Moreover, the analysis of the binary and count variable of the human 
rights policy indicates a positive relationship between the amount of trade and human rights 
interference by the EU. In addition, the analysis of the ordinal variable shows that there is a 
positive relationship between the intensity of the trade relations indicated by the presence of a 
PTA and the harshness of the measures used. 
Of course my research design contains several limitations. By doing a quantitative 
analysis, I might run the risk of overlooking underlying explanations for the inconsistencies of 
the EU human rights policy. I do not consider the internal structure of the EU and treat the EU 
as a unitary actor. This might limit my understanding of the internal dynamic of drafting EU 
human rights policy which may account for some explaining value of the EU’s apparently 
inconsistent policy. Furthermore, due to generalization for the sake of quantitative research, 
the effects of measures on a case-by-case basis cannot be assessed. For example, as 
Kinzelbach and Smith already argued, there is a difference in the effect of different sanctions 
on a specific country. A sanction itself is expected to be a harsh measure, however, the effect 
of sanctions such as a visa ban or arms embargo on country with low material vulnerability 
are negligible compared to the suspension of aid or a trade agreement in the areas in which 
that country does need to trade with the EU. Therefore, the ordinal variable I created on the 
basis of my own judgement might lack accurate measurement of the effect of different 
instruments on a specific third country.  
In addition, using the EU’s Annual Reports on human rights I risked the same coding 
bias as other databases that rely on Annual Reports such as CIRI and Political Terror Index. 
An increase in human rights measures taken may be caused by the fact that the report of a 
specific year or country is more detailed than other years or countries. The amount and 
severity of measures in my analysis might then increase without an actual increase in practice 
taking place. Furthermore, some countries may be reported in more detail than others which 
creates the risk of increase of amount and severity of measures related to other countries only 
due to the fact that measures in other countries are simply not reported. 
However, my research does imply some valuable policy recommendations and 
suggestions for further research. First, the EU must be aware that its human rights policy 
appears to be inconsistent especially when analysed on a case by case basis. However, my 
research indicates that decisions whether or not to interfere in a specific way in a certain 
country are not only determined by the amount of trade between the EU and a certain third 
country but also by several other factors that include the stability of the environment in which 
they interfere. These findings can contribute to the awareness of the EU about what factors 
40 
 
determine their decision to interfere in a specific country to address human rights. 
Additionally, due to this awareness, the EU might purify its communication on the rationale 
behind these interferences in order to reduce the appearance of inconsistency that is so 
commonly assumed. However, more detailed research that especially focuses on the effect 
certain measures have on the economic relationship with different countries might provide 
even more insight in the actual benefit of using them in either achieving possession or milieu 
goals.  
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